INTRODUCTION
The rise of "executive government" has prompted a great deal of public debate and scholarly theorizing.
1 This Article examines one aspect of that very large subject: agency budgets or, more precisely, revenues. The inquiry, we suggest, merits attention beyond a narrow circle of public finance scholars. Approaching the administrative state from its most pedestrian front opens a window both into its actual operation and constitutional rule of law questions.
The notion that monetary and other tangible incentives shape the contours of public administration is in many ways foundational to the American experiment. Our system of "checks and balances" is a system of incentives. The written Constitution is unequivocal, indeed emphatic, in committing fiscal powers to Congress and in withholding them from the executive, the better to safeguard the separation of powers.
2 And in several clauses, the Constitution specifies with precision who can and must be paid what and by whom. University. An earlier version of this essay was presented at the Transatlantic Law Forum's Annual Conference, conducted at the GMU Law & Economics Center in June 2015. We thank the LEC for its sponsorship and the participants for their helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks to Mackenzi Siebert and Abby Chestnut for splendid and timely research assistance. 13 Correspondingly, the general assumption that Congress will jealously guard the powers of the purse as its ultimate means of checking and balancing the executive has become open to serious doubt: in many respects, those powers have fallen into disuse. 14 This Article sketches the parameters of agency self-finance and offers several suggestive examples. It is sketchy and suggestive because of the paucity of publically available data. Neither the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of the Treasury, the enforcement agencies, nor Congress publishes-or evidently even compiles-systematic accounts of agency revenue raising and the uses made of such funds. Thus, one purpose of this Article is simply to identify the phenomenon and call for greater official documentation and transparency. However, lack of comprehensive data notwithstanding, the existing evidence warrants serious speculation on questions of cause and consequence.
What drives the trend toward agency self-financing? The most tempting answer is public indebtedness. The federal budget consists mostly of transfer payments, interest payments on the debt, and payments for a minimum level of national defense 15 -expenditures that are effectively untouchable. Thus, whatever budget discipline can be had must fall on "discretionary" spending, including payments for the ordinary operations of government. 16 Congress may find the benefits of agency contributions worth the costs of giving up a degree of appropriations control.
There is something to this. But the explanation is a bit unsatisfactory. Foremost, tendencies toward off-budget agency finance date back some four decades, and they show no obvious correspondence to economic conditions or budget cycles. 17 This Article suggests instead that the growth of off-budget finance reflects a pervasive, secular trend to executive government. 13 See Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 874 (2014) (detailing the profits that the DOJ, HHS, and Treasury have made which supplemented their own budgets as well as the budget of Congress).
14 See Christopher DeMuth Sr., Our Voracious Executive Branch, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, June
About the existence of that trend, there is not the slightest doubt. A large body of scholarship has described it, discussed its causes and effects, and traced its implications for administrative law and doctrine. 18 Approaching the subject through the lens of agency finance-more specifically, the agencies' growing ability to combine regulatory mandates and enforcement with the powers of outright taxing and spending-may help to enrich understanding of the phenomena in three respects.
First, the inquiry can yield useful empirical data. Dollars can be counted for purposes of comparing agencies, programs, and trends over time. To be sure, scholars have also tallied and analyzed the cost of regulation, the numbers of pages and rulemaking notices in the Federal Register, the ratio of agency regulations to statutory law, and even sub-regulatory devices such as "interpretive guidelines," "Dear Colleague" letters to regulated parties, or "Frequently Asked Questions" bulletins and online postings. 19 But each of those figures is a proxy and, while compiled with increasing sophistication, 20 involves intractable problems of measurement and interpretation. And although dollars, too, are a proxy-an agency such as the EPA with a relatively small budget can command vastly greater private resources through rulemaking-the unit of measurement is relatively unproblematic. Furthermore, dollars have proven a pretty good proxy. A longstanding program of analyzing agency budgets by form of regulation (economic, social, financial, etc.) has yielded many useful insights. 21 Second, the inquiry opens a perspective on the administrative state in actual operation, as distinct from its appearance in agency pronouncements, court decisions, and law reviews and textbooks with their heavy emphasis on doctrine. Scholars have lamented the increased disconnect between administrative law and practice. 22 Examples include the once rare, now common practice of multi-agency rulemakings; 23 the emergence of special status agencies, such as the IRS and the Federal Reserve Board, as regulatory agencies 18 See generally sources cited supra note 1. 19 See, e.g., CLYDE WAYNE CREWS JR., TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 2-4 (2016) (estimating the annual cost of regulatory compliance and economic costs at $1.88 trillion annually). 20 The latest and most ambitious effort is the RegData program of the Mercatus Center at George Regulations, 1997 , REG. & GOVERNANCE, 1-2 (2015 . 21 See SUSAN and federalism architects; 24 the proliferation of novel forms of administrative practice in the financial regulatory sector; 25 "regulation by threat"; 26 the implementation of public law through second-order private agreements; 27 and "cooperative" federal-state regulation achieved through comprehensive settlements in the shadow of the law and, sometimes, in a virtually law-free zone.
28 Agency self-finance should be added to the growing list of practices for which the existing corpus juris is inadequate to the realities of administrative practice.
Third, and relatedly, agency self-finance bears on many of the central themes of administrative and constitutional law: delegation and the separation of powers, congressional oversight, agency independence, the choice between rulemaking and enforcement or adjudication, and judicial review. In many of these domains, the debate over the administrative state and its law has become excessively abstract and formalistic. By way of prominent, highly germane example, the perennial controversy over "independent" administrative agencies continues to revolve around the President's removal powers-an important aspect of agency design and operation, to be sure, but not the only feature of administrative governance that commands attention. While money may not change everything, 30 following its trail is generally a sound practice in private affairs and, in public affairs, a matter of considerable and indeed constitutional concern.
31 In this light, a focus on agency budgets may pay dividends in understanding not only the actual operation of the administrative state but also its constitutional contours.
Part I of this Article describes an increasingly common form of agency fiscal independence: delegated tax powers. Part II discusses the rapidly growing practice of government finance through agency policing, enforcement, and "settlements." Part III offers some tentative thoughts on the origins and consequences of off-budget agency finance.
I. EXECUTIVE TAXING AND SPENDING

32
The federal government collects most of its revenue through explicit statutory taxes: individual and corporate income taxes, payroll taxes for Social Security and Medicare, estate and gift taxes, customs duties, and an array of excise taxes.
33 But executive agencies also raise revenue from license fees, royalties, proceeds from public lands, the sale of ordinary goods and services, and legal fines and settlements.
34 Some of that revenue comes from proprietary government activities that could as well be performed by for-profit private firms, such as military post exchanges ("PXs") and the U.S. Mint. 35 Additional revenue comes from a wide range of user fees for using national 30 But see CINDY LAUPER, Money Changes Everything, on SHE'S SO UNUSUAL (Portrait Records 1983 On the spending side of the ledger, the constitutional rule that moneys may not be spent except through congressional appropriations admits of many exceptions, most of them linked to these non-tax revenues.
37 Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities ("NAFIs") are moneymaking, self-financing enterprises that are managed by federal employees and treated as government entities for most legal purposes, including procurement, contracting, and liability.
38 NAFIs include numerous organizations devoted to meeting the needs of military service members and their families: PXs, gyms, clubs, and sports leagues to name a few. 39 Outside of the military, NAFIs range from the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to the Graduate School of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 40 User fees charged by regular federal agencies are either remitted to the Treasury or held by the agencies; when held by the agencies, expenditure of these funds may or may not be subject to appropriations. 41 The device of the "revolving fund" permits agencies to continuously collect user fees and spend them on specified purposes, thereby establishing "permanent indefinite appropriations."
42
Revolving funds are increasingly used to permit regulatory and enforcement 36 For a review of fee-funded programs and the design of user fees collected as a part of the federal budget (amounting to nearly $300 billion in 2012), see generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, agencies to use fines and settlements to operate their own spending programs.
43
These forms of executive self-financing are only roughly defined and accounted for. No one knows how many NAFIs exist. 44 Similarly, Congress's policy of making non-NAFI regulatory agencies self-financing through user fees and other devices, an effort that began in earnest under the Reagan administration, 45 appears to have outstripped the legislature's monitoring capacity. Consider the Customs and Immigration Service (CIS), which processes and adjudicates immigrant applications for green cards (lawful permanent resident status), work permits, naturalization, and dozens of subsidiary classifications.
46 Through a series of incremental steps culminating in the 2002 "homeland security" legislation following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress directed that the CIS cover essentially its entire budget through application fees. 47 This means, for example, that the $985 filing fee for a green card covers not only the CIS's review and processing costs, but also a share of its activities that do not generate revenue, such as adjudication and asylum applications. The CIS does not have a formal revolving fund-it has requested one-but retains fee revenues in its own account and maintains that account over time to cover essentially its entire budget without congressional appropriations. 48 The agency's special status came to light in November 2014, in the wake of President Obama's executive revision of statutory immigration policies that many in Congress opposed on constitutional or policy grounds or both. 49 Shortly after the President announced his actions, opponents announced that they would countermand them with a rider to the CIS's 43 See infra notes 169-174 and accompanying text. 44 See U.S GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, appropriations for the coming year. 50 A few days later came the embarrassed retraction: staffers had discovered that USCIS is self-funded and financially independent of Congress.
51
The fact that many in Congress were unaware that an agency as important as the CIS was not dependent on congressional appropriations illustrates both the increasing informality of federal taxing and spending and Congress's loss of interest in using its power of the purse over the evolution of policy. Consistent with that pattern, Congress has increasingly empowered agencies to calculate and impose outright taxes-charges unrelated to any service provided 52 -and to exercise wide discretion in how the revenues are spent. Examples of such delegated taxing power include the Federal Communication Commission's ("FCC") "universal service" fees and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's ("PCAOB") annual assessments on audited companies.
53 A more peculiar case is the financing of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") through transfers from Federal Reserve revenues.
54
A. The FCC's Universal Service Program
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 authorizes the FCC to set and collect taxes for promoting "universal service" and gives the FCC wide discretion to determine whom to tax, at what rate to tax, and how to spend the 50 revenues. 55 The FCC's annual operating budget of about $500 million is covered entirely by a combination of the agency's licensing and other fees and a share of the net proceeds from its spectrum auction programs. However, those expenditures remain subject to annual appropriations by Congress in response to FCC budget requests. 56 In contrast, the universal service program is administered for the FCC by a subsidiary nonprofit corporation, the Universal Service Administrative Company, whose revenues and expenditures are independent of annual budget requests and congressional appropriations.
57
Prior to the 1996 Telecommunications Act, Congress had sought to ensure "universal" telecommunications service through a complex system of cross-subsidies among service providers. 58 In substance, the FCC permitted AT&T to maintain a long-distance monopoly in exchange for supporting local carriers, and local carriers in turn charged rates that favored residential over business customers and rural over urban customers. 59 Then, recognizing that telecommunication markets had become naturally competitive, Congress replaced regulatory cross-subsidies with direct subsidies for certain groups and financed them through the universal service fee ("USF"). 60 The contribution is a tax in all but name. It has no relation to any benefit conferred by the FCC; instead, it is based on the agency's self-determined funding needs for its subsidy schemes. 61 The FCC collects the tax on the interstate and international revenues of landline and wireless telecommunications companies, cable companies that provide voice service, and paging service companies.
62
The providers, in turn, pass the assessments on to their customers. 63 The tax is much higher than the 3 percent statutory federal excise tax on telephone service, and the FCC adjusts it each quarter to keep pace with its program 55 Phil Weiser, Paradigm Changes in Telecommunications Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 819, 824 (2000) (noting that Congress "did not provide much guidance as to exactly how it should be implemented" and instead "handed the ball to the FCC, mandating that the FCC work with a Joint Federal-State Board . . . to figure it out."). 56 spending. 64 In recent years the tax rate has ranged from 15.7 percent in Q3 2014 to 18.2 percent in Q1 2016. 65 The revenues amounted to $8.7 billion in 2015. 66 The FCC spends those revenues on grant programs for landline, wireless, broadband, and Wi-Fi equipment; services for schools, libraries, and rural health care facilities; and rate-subsidies for low-income and rural customers. 67 For example, the FCC's "Lifeline" program-one of four broad program funded through the USF-provides a free basic wireless phone or landline installation and free basic telephone service (250 minutes per month) to about twelve million low-income customers, at a cost of $1.6 billion annually. 68 The programs have been widely criticized as ineffective and scandal-prone, with very high administrative costs to boot. 69 
B. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 established the PCAOB to regulate accounting firms that audit public companies (i.e., companies that issue publicly-traded stock) and broker-dealers in public stocks. 70 The PCAOB's annual budget of about $250 million is funded almost entirely by its own tax, which it calls an "accounting support fee," on the equity capital or net asset value of public companies and broker-dealers. 71 The PCAOB establishes its operating budget for the year, subtracts a small sum from the annual fees it collects from the accounting firms it regulates (about $1.6 million), and assigns the remaining value to public companies and broker-dealers on a pro rata basis according to their size as measured by equity capital or net asset value.
72 Additionally, the PCAOB exempts smaller public companies from its tax, and it typically funds part of each year's budget from carryover tax and fee revenues from prior years. 73 Most recently, in 2015, the total accounting support fee was $226.6 million where approximately $199.1 million was allocated to public companies and $27.5 million was allocated to brokerdealers. 74 The PCAOB, like the FCC's Universal Service Administrative Company, is a 501(c)(3) (nonprofit) subsidiary of a regulatory agency-here, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). 75 And though the SEC must approve the Board's annual budget, the PCAOB is itself entirely independent of congressional appropriations. This is made explicit in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which contains several provisions emphasizing that the PCAOB is independent of Congress and that its revenues are not "monies of the United States."
76 Even so, the Board's taxes and accounting regulations are federally enforced legal obligations.
C. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
The CFPB, established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 78 enjoys a different form of self-financing. The CFPB is funded by a draw-up to a statutory cap-from the revenues of the Federal Reserve System ("The Fed").
79 The Fed's revenues come from fees on private banks and earnings from open market operations. The Fed covers its own operating budget, along with other expected expenses, from the bank fees and remits the remainder to the Treasury. 80 The CFPB's budget, like that of the Fed, is entirely independent of congressional appropriations, but is 72 capped at 12 percent of the Fed's operating budget. 81 Currently the Fed's expenses total almost $5.5 billion while the CFPB's budget is about $500 million.
II. FOR-PROFIT LAW ENFORCEMENT
For-profit law enforcement, meaning an enforcement system that permits enforcers to keep all or part of the proceeds of the action, has a long and storied history in the United States. The obvious argument in favor of forprofit enforcement is the creation of individual and agency incentives: to the extent that enforcers may "eat what they kill," they will be more aggressive. The argument against it is the fiendish difficulty of creating the right set of economic incentives to generate an optimal level of enforcement and deterrence. 83 Since the turn of the nineteenth century, the general (though not unbroken) practice in the United States has been to permit private enforcers, including so-called qui tam plaintiffs, to sue for profit while prohibiting public enforcers from doing the same. 84 Among the most common arrangements is to provide that all monies collected in the process of public enforcement must be deposited in the general treasury.
85
Over the last few decades, this general understanding has eroded. One observes a pronounced trend toward a merging of private and public enforcement agencies and their functions. 86 have been motivated to act as "private attorneys general." 87 At the same time, public enforcers at all levels of government have come to behave more and more like private profit-maximizers. While individual officers are still prohibited from benefitting directly from their enforcement activities, numerous public agencies have gained a stake in maximizing the financial proceeds of their enforcement activities.
88 Somewhat perplexingly, these tendencies have been accompanied by a proliferation of criminal provisions of an open-ended nature, especially in the area of "economic" crimes: fraud, misappropriation, misrepresentation, violations of fiduciary duties, failure to provide "honest services," "corruption," and mail fraud. 89 Many of these violations are loosely defined and carry draconian penalties. 90 According to the traditional understanding, the fact that statutes of this nature are easily over-enforced was a potent argument for public enforcement discretion that would be (1) bounded by the enforcers' need to obtain legislative appropriations and (2) guided by public-regarding considerations, including a concern for possible miscarriages of justice.
91 Just the opposite has happened.
A. Examples of For-Profit Law Enforcement
The tendencies just described appear to be independent of partisan politics, political fluctuations, and economic and fiscal circumstances. Instead they are a secular trend, observable at all levels of government-local, state, and federal. 36-37 (1975) .
Ferguson 2015
After the shooting of a black man by a white police officer, race riots broke out in the predominantly black neighborhood of Ferguson, Missouri. 92 One official report found the shooting to be an act of self-defense and cleared the officer of any misconduct. 93 Another report found that the local police department had for many years issued citations and collected fines for traffic violations and other petty-and often non-existent-offenses, in an obvious effort to bolster its budget. 94 The department's oppressive campaign, the report concluded, was a principal cause of high levels of distrust and mutual hostility between the police force and the local population. The deployment of automated cameras for policing traffic violationsthe running of stop lights and speeding-in major cities has clearly been motivated by revenue-raising as well as safety considerations, with revenue raising predominating in at least some cases. 96 Among the allegations bolstering such a claim are: (1) that cameras are positioned at tempting rather than dangerous intersections;
97 (2) The single most consequential enforcement action to date is the 1998 Multistate Settlement Agreement ("MSA") between the attorneys general, major tobacco manufacturers, and private plaintiffs' attorneys. In a settlement of class actions brought by all states in cooperation with private attorneys, the manufacturers agreed to pay over $250 billion over a period of twenty-five years (thereafter, the MSA is to run in perpetuity).
103 While the agreement supposedly settled claims against the manufacturers for past misconduct-specifically, the costs that manufacturers' products allegedly inflicted on the states' Medicaid programs-the payments are calculated on the basis of future tobacco sales; and the agreement is cleverly structured to ensure that virtually the entire cost of the settlement falls on consumers. The MSA has since served as a model for multi-state enforcement campaigns against pharmaceutical manufacturers, financial companies, and other corporate targets.
106 Increasingly, moreover, state attorneys general sue not on the state's behalf, but in so-called "mass actions" on behalf of citizens alleged to have been victimized by corporate misconduct.
107 Very often, those victims cannot be identified, or their individual damages cannot be assessed, without incurring inordinate administrative costs. 108 In such scenarios, the law permits so-called cy-près distributions, meaning a disposition that approximates the intended beneficiaries' interests as closely as possible. 109 In practice, that circle has proven quite wide. Cy-près beneficiaries have included advocacy groups, shell entities created by the defendant corporation for its own benefit, and the prosecuting attorneys' associates. Beginning in the 1970s, Congress and state legislatures incentivized public agencies to conduct a "war on drugs" by means of asset forfeiture, meaning the pre-trial and pre-conviction seizure of assets from suspected violators.
111 Initially limited to drugs and drug paraphernalia, the statutes soon came to cover the instruments and the proceeds of suspected drug trade, from cars to cash. 112 In 1984, Congress authorized the Department of Justice ("DOJ") to keep the proceeds of asset forfeiture for its own use.
113 Subsequently, the legislature enacted a "fair share" statute authorizing the DOJ to 105 For a full account of the MSA's origins, structure, and implications see generally MARTHA A. share the proceeds of asset forfeitures for federal crimes with the local authorities that made the seizure. 114 Empirical and econometric studies have shown that the "war on drugs" has been driven by executive as well as legislative budgetary considerations. 115 The "fair share" program proved sufficiently lucrative to spawn a cottage industry of consulting firms.
116 Operating under black-ops names, these firms instruct law enforcement agencies in the interception of "suspicious" vehicles and drivers and in the circumvention of constitutional rules against warrantless searches and seizures. 117 
Corporate Crime
The single largest venue of for-profit law enforcement is corporate crime and misconduct. Unlike many other legal systems, U.S. law permits enforcers to prosecute corporations rather than-or in addition to-their individual officers or employees.
118 Over the past decade or so, such prosecutions have become increasingly common. Professor Brandon L. Garrett's widely cited study, Too Big to Jail, counts 2,262 prosecutions from 2001-2012, with a pronounced upward trend.
119 Fines and other payments recovered in these actions have risen even more dramatically. Average payments have risen largely due to an explosion of very high-end settlements, often exceeding $1 billion. ("DPAs") or Non-Prosecution Agreements ("NPAs"). 121 The first such agreement was reported in 1994; since then, the practice has spread.
122 Appendix 1 provides an annual count of such settlements and their aggregate amounts for the years 2001-2014 based on Professor Garrett's data and a partially overlapping count and analysis by the law firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. 123 We caution that the data are somewhat impressionistic. While a court must approve DPAs, 124 NPAs require no such approval; 125 and no official count appears available from any government source. The settlement volume is likewise a matter of conjecture, as is the distribution of the funds. Many settlements are wholly undisclosed and confidential; others disclose aggregate figures in the form of self-serving press releases.
These cautions acknowledged, and a large year-to-year variance notwithstanding, there is no mistaking the overall trend: beginning in 2004 or thereabouts, both the number and the settlement amounts of DPAs and NPAs increased substantially.
B. Corporate Prosecutions: Some (Cautious) Observations and Interpretation
The forgoing examples provide a sense of movement toward for-profit law enforcement at all levels of government and in a wide range of venues and institutional settings. The remainder of this Section dives deeper into federally led criminal and civil actions against large corporations. The Section first presents some empirical data, then turns to salient features that bear on the central theme of agency finance: (1) the rising tide of such prosecution and monetized settlements; (2) the apparent focus on economic sectors with intense financial and regulatory relationships with the government; (3) the pattern of consistent legislative support for expanding the practice; (4) a pronounced tendency toward "presidentialism"; and (5) a startling lack of public accountability at all stages of the proceedings, including the disposition of funds. 
Monetized Law Enforcement
Professor Garrett's study of corporate criminal prosecutions over the 2001-2012 period marshals impressive evidence of the sharp increase in such prosecutions, aggregate fines collected, and settlement volume. 127 However, as the author explains, the study does not provide a full picture of the landscape. 128 The study does not include state prosecutions. Nor does it include civil proceedings brought by federal agencies (such as the SEC), government tort actions for natural resource damages that are well nigh indistinguishable from fines, 129 or qui tam actions. 130 Finally, the author's data cannot provide a full picture of the financial transfers. As already noted, settlements are frequently confidential. Publicly advertised settlement values often differ wildly from actual and actually paid amounts, and the payment streams to different federal agencies, states, private parties, and qui tam plaintiffs are difficult to trace.
131
For somewhat closer observation, this Article homes in on one specific subset of settlements: civil and criminal settlements for $100 million or more with commercial and investment banks, involving one or more federal agency (often in league with state attorneys general) from 2000 through late 2015. A summary, based on agency press releases and news reports as well as Professor Garrett's posted data on criminal settlements, is presented at Appendix 2. As one would expect, the sample is dominated by the legal sequela of the 2008 financial collapse. There were few big-money bank settlements of any kind before 2009. Thereafter, several cases involved municipal bond underwriting (designated "Muni Bid-Rigging"), 132 violations of U.S. trade embargos (designated "IEEP Laundering"), 133 and tax and securities fraud. 134 From 2010 onward, the number and size of settlements increased dramatically, and the picture is dominated by allegations of conduct said to have contributed to the 2008 financial collapse-inadequate disclosure of the 127 GARRETT, supra note 119, at 292-95. 128 Id. at 7-8, 291-92. 129 risks of banks' residential mortgages and mortgage-back securities ("MBS") sold to private purchasers, government agencies, and the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (in federal conservatorship at the time of the settlements); 135 "inadequate internal procedures" and documentation for processing mortgage originations and foreclosures; 136 and LIBOR rate-fixing. 137 Government press releases accompanying these settlements often characterized them as punishment for conduct that had contributed to the 2008 "mortgage meltdown."
138
Where did the money go? The lion's share of settlement proceeds was remitted directly or indirectly to the U.S. Treasury. 139 However, substantial sums were paid to Fannie and Freddie, the Federal Housing Administration, and what Appendix 2 refers to as the "Other Fed" category: the Federal Reserve, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and nearly $7.8 billion was divided among various groups of state attorneys generals. 140 The single largest settlement category, "Restitution" ($44.75 billion), is something of a hodge-podge, and a highly intriguing one. It includes sums paid directly by settling banks to designated parties in restitution for harms resulting from the conduct in question; sums paid to the Justice Department, SEC, or state attorneys general for distribution (through mechanisms such as the SEC's "Fair Fund" 141 ) to groups described with more or less specificity in press releases and court documents; and funding of non-securities broker/dealers (i.e., unaffiliated with a commercial or investment bank) and other entities, including a February 2015 settlement with Standard & Poor's for allegedly misrepresenting the risks of MBSs and related securities in its securities ratings. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Department and State Partners Secure $1.375 Billion Settlement with S&P for Defrauding Investors in the Lead Up to the Financial Crisis (Feb. 3, 2015) , https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-state-partners-secure-1375-billion-settlement-sp-defrauding-investors. Of that $1.375 billion settlement, $687.5 million went to the federal government and $687. profit groups for causes related (sometimes only tangentially) to the alleged misconduct.
142
The most thoroughly documented agreement appears to be the $25 billion "National Mortgage Settlement" in February 2012, involving five leading banks that allegedly followed questionable mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure practices. 143 The $23.75 billion portion of the settlement in the "Restitution" category of Appendix 2 includes $3 billion of bank refinancings for mortgages of borrowers who were delinquent in their payments or whose homes had fallen in value to less that the principal due.
144 Another $7 billion was dedicated to bank "consumer relief" for certain mortgage borrowers who were unemployed or in military service plus additional, somewhat mysterious categories such as "anti-blight activities."
145 "Restitution" further included a government-administered $1.5 billion "payment fund" for borrowers whose mortgages had been foreclosed upon.
146 Approximately $2.5 billion was distributed by state attorneys general to hundreds of state and local agencies and non-profit organizations. 147 The settlement documents and press coverage were much less precise about the sums collected by government agencies for their own accounts. It appears that $912 million was retained by federal agencies, with most of it deposited in the FHA's capital fund. 148 Additionally, approximately $350 million was divided among state attorneys general and associations of state regulatory agencies. 152 It included $387.5 million for "a fund to benefit consumers of the firms," $432.5 million to be spent by the firms on securities research by independent firms, and $80 million to "fund and promote investor education."
153 Another $487.5 million was divided among state attorneys general. 154 That agreement seems to have served as the template for the post-2008 settlements. Still, the 2008 response differs in two respects: it was led by federal rather than state agencies, and it appears to have been entirely money-driven, to the virtual exclusion of individual prosecutions.
155
The progression from criminal law enforcement to monetized settlements may have a legal explanation, such as the difficulty of obtaining individual convictions or differential evidence of actual wrongdoing. It may have a political explanation, such as partisan control of federal agencies and state attorneys general offices or the financial institutions' lobbying clout and personal connections. However, the progression is also consistent with an agency-centered theory of non-appropriated budget maximization. While we cannot defend that theory against its rivals with any great confidence, it remains among the plausible candidates.
Government Relations
Our sample of corporate prosecutions is hardly representative. It is dominated by a crisis that cost the federal government hundreds of billions of dollars, that many political leaders and legislators had attributed to "greed on Wall Street," and that led to insistent demands for criminal punishment of the evildoers. 156 Moreover, the government's relationship with the financial 151 The Supreme Court eventually overturned that conviction in a unanimous decision. Arthur An- sector is uniquely intense, intimate, and co-dependent. The federal government regulates, subsidizes, supervises, and insures the banks. It operates a national bank that collaborates continuously with private banks in the conduct of monetary policy and other matters. 157 The U.S. Treasury and other agencies also collaborate continuously with the banks in borrowing and repaying vast sums for financing the government's own operations as well as a range of private activities, especially residential mortgages, student loans, and sales of American products to foreign purchasers. 158 State and municipal governments do many of these things as well. Billions of dollars move back and forth between the government and private commercial and investment banks every week, and their top executives also move back and forth regularly. 159 Moreover, in the years preceding the 2008 financial collapse federal agencies, including regulatory agencies, had been avid promoters of highly leveraged, loosely secured mortgage lending and of the explosive growth of MBS markets. 160 So it is easy to imagine that the huge bank settlements of the past five years, whatever the legal merits of the individual cases, were to some degree transactional-a squaring-up of accounts in one line of a financial partnership that had gone terribly awry.
That said, available data suggest that a comprehensive tabulation of the past two decades' large legal settlements would reveal that they are not targeted at a single industry, are not a "crisis response" phenomenon, and are not a response to a sudden outbreak of corporate greed and criminality. Professor Garrett's much larger set of criminal prosecutions is dominated by pharmaceutical companies and violators of antitrust statutes and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 161 Available data for prosecutions under the False Claims Act show the same pattern, as does a separate, though partially overlapping data series on settlements with pharmaceutical companies.
162 Similarly, data on joint state prosecutions fail to demonstrate any crisis response pattern or a preoccupation with the financial sector. Pharmaceutical firm settlements rank ahead of all other targets at 20.5 percent, followed by banks and insurers at 10.9 percent combined. (Nov. 18, 2016) , http://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-tightens-rules-addressing-alleged-revolving-door-with-wall-street-1479488428. 160 See Brown, supra note 157, at 8-10. 161 Large civil and criminal settlements have one thing in common: overwhelmingly, they involve firms with substantial long-term relationships with federal and state governments. Banking and finance are but the most extreme example of a model of regulation and a pattern of intimate government-corporate relations that also applies to pharmaceuticals, defense and aerospace, health care and medical insurance, automobiles, telecommunications, and energy. 164 In all those sectors, the corporatist partnerships have prompted public discontent and political agitation over "crony capitalism."
165 Politics demands some form of sanction; and yet the partnership must continue. Financial settlements may be one way of accommodating those rival imperatives.
Congressional Support
Public prosecutors appear to have been quite creative in devising novel instruments to monetize criminal enforcement; the prolonged boom market in DPAs and NPAs is an example. 166 For the most part, though, it is difficult to portray the phenomenon as a prosecutorial rampage: it has occurred with the full support of Congress (and for that matter of state legislatures). For example, statutes enacted in hasty response to crisis events or newspaper headlines routinely expand definitions of corporate misconduct, increase penalties, and facilitate prosecutions. 167 Congressional hearings routinely urge greater prosecutorial zeal; occasionally, they serve to generate information and even predicate acts for prosecutions.
168
Among the robust indicators of congressional support is the creation of "revolving funds."
169 Such funds permit agencies to keep the proceeds of their enforcement activities, in whole or in part, instead of depositing them, as ordinarily required, in the U.S. Treasury. One previously mentioned fund supports the DOJ's asset forfeiture program; 170 another, the DOJ's enforcement of the False Claims Act. 171 Another fund, created in 1996, is the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program, jointly administered by the Department 164 Of course these sectors amount to a large share of the economy as a whole. Our prediction is that their share of settlements will be even larger (and that the also large retail grocery sector will appear only in an occasional antitrust proceeding, if at all). 165 of Justice and the Department of Health and Human Services. 172 Yet another is the CFPB's Civil Penalty Fund: under Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Bureau may keep the proceeds of its enforcement activities for its own use or the benefit of certain third parties. 173 As previously mentioned, the SEC "Fair Fund" was established by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to permit the agency to distribute civil penalties to defrauded investors at its discretion. 174 As those varied examples suggest, congressional support for monetized law enforcement has enjoyed bipartisan support for a considerable period of time.
Presidential Enforcement
Legal scholars and political scientists have consistently found a tendency toward executive government; and within the executive, a shift of authority from routinized administration to political decision-making from line administrators to heads of departments and the White House.
175 Corporate crime enforcement reflects the same tendency. In the "big" cases, the sums are simply too large, the targets are too prominent and well connected, and the economic and political ramifications are too significant to be left to line prosecutors. A JP Morgan settlement was agreed upon in a meeting between the bank's chief executive, Jamie Dimon, and the Attorney General of the United States. 176 BP's first "settlement" of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, in the amount of $20 billion, was memorialized in a wholly novel legal form-a joint press release with the White House. 16, 2010) , https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-after-meeting-with-bp-executives). We put "settlement" in quotes because the agreement settled nothing at all. In particular, it provided BP with no protection against legal proceedings by multiple parties. Id.
Perhaps, the trend toward "presidential" government is better described as a trend toward political administration. It does not signal greater centralization. Rather, as noted, agencies at all levels of government seem emboldened to press their enforcement authority. In a very real sense, they compete in the enforcement market for targets and revenues: a phenomenon that has necessitated many multi-agency settlements. Within each agency, however, decision-making authority has migrated upward to elected and other political officials.
Oversight
Corporate prosecutions are very poorly monitored by outside actors at all stages: investigation, indictment, settlement, and remedies. Congressional oversight has been sporadic at best, and one may reasonably doubt whether Congress can police settlement authority, once it has been conferred, in an effective fashion.
178 Judicial oversight is equally haphazard. Some settlements receive judicial sanction; others do not. Even where judicial approval is obtained, review is highly perfunctory even when potent criminal charges are settled for a relative pittance and the defendants obtain immunity from prosecution. In one highly noted case, when a district judge insisted that the parties show some evidence to the effect that the settlement was not mere collusion, an appellate court reversed the holding. 179 Similarly, in a broadly worded opinion, the D.C. Circuit reversed a district court's attempt to subject a Deferred Prosecution Agreement to judicial scrutiny. for restitution or compensation for the supposed victims of the alleged misconduct, such as mortgage debtors or student borrowers. 182 Studies have consistently found such arrangements to be very poorly monitored, 183 for the obvious reason that neither party to the agreement has much of a stake in its success. 184 Courts have better things to do with their time. To date, legislators have largely made do with requesting the occasional Government Accountability Office ("GAO") report.
185
A bit more surprisingly, while the urge to monetize corporate investigations appears to be strong and getting stronger, there's no telling where the money went 186 or, indeed, whether it is paid in the first place. The collection rate for payments to many federal agencies is in the single digits.
187 Revolving fund collections are probably more substantial; 188 however, in the absence of any robust evidence, it is difficult to be confident about the magnitude. Congress, for its part, has legislated regular reporting requirements for revolving funds.
189 However, the agencies do not report collection ratios. For enforcement proceeds collected outside of revolving funds, data is only partially available, mostly from private watchdog groups or agency press releases. L. 679, 689-95 (2008) (discussing corporate compliance programs and their emphasis on corporate culture). However, it is exceedingly difficult to operationalize such an objective, and harder yet to translate it into practice. A financial firm's agreement to hire 1,000 additional compliance officers-all of whom are a raw net cost-may in fact enhance the organizational stature and dominance of the traders and dealmakers: profits and rents must be earned before they can be dissipated. Thus, compliance and monitoring are bound to turn into bureaucratic bean-counting exercises: monitors hired, meetings conducted, reports produced. We know of no systematic study of the issue; however, the basic intuitions are straightforward. 185 See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 10-110, CORPORATE CRIME: DOJ HAS 
III. OFF-BUDGET AGENCY FINANCE: QUESTIONS AND SPECULATIONS
The first, obvious conclusion from the preceding discussion is that better data is needed, both for reasons of good government and for purposes of legal and policy analysis. Obtaining such data for the federal government, let alone states, would exceed the capacity of individual scholars or research teams. Most likely, it would require a congressional mandate compelling the executive to collect systematic revenue and expenditure data from and across a multitude of agencies. The Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget, as well as the GAO, Congressional Budget Office, and Congressional Research Service, need to get on the case. The dearth of information is itself revealing. While no one set out to create an entire system of independent agency finance, we are moving impressively in that direction. In order to understand why it is happening and what might be done about it, particulars and patterns of what has transpired must be brought to light.
A second, more tentative conclusion is that some doctrines of administrative law may need revisiting. For instance, the constitutional rule of congressional delegation of regulatory authority is that Congress must provide an "intelligible principle," a requirement that has not been found wanting in any Supreme Court case since 1935. 191 Among the proffered reasons for that permissive approach is the alleged impossibility of identifying judicially manageable standards to distinguish permissible from excessive delegations. 192 Do the Constitution's clear textual assignments of taxing and appropriation powers counsel a different, more stringent and formalistic approach with respect to Congress's powers of the purse? The Supreme Court's and the appellate courts' general answer has been "no"; here as with regulatory delegations, the constraints on Congress are vanishingly weak. 193 What, though, of an agency that is vouchsafed expansive rulemaking authority combined with its own taxing and spending authorities-and perhaps also, as with the CFPB, protections against presidential removal of the principal officers? 194 This Article's third and grandest conclusion is that agency taxation and for-profit enforcement does indeed belong in the larger discussions of the rise of executive government. The appearance of self-financing executive government challenges earlier explanations of the phenomenon and might lead to a fuller explanation. Theorizing has tended to focus either on the incentives and behavior of the Congress and its members, or on the incentives and behavior of agencies and their officials. Congress's handing agencies taxing and spending powers along with lawmaking power demands that the two be considered together. As it happens, each of the authors of this Article has written separately on the two subjects, in ways that could lead to an integrated approach.
One of the authors, Christopher DeMuth, has linked the rise of executive government and the corresponding decline of Congress to growing affluence and education and advances in information and communication technologies. 196 He argues that these developments, by greatly increasing political participation and reducing political transactions costs, have transformed both sides of the market for government policy. 197 On the demand side, an enormous array of discrete interest groups can now organize effectively to lobby for government interventions.
198 On the supply side, politics has become entrepreneurial and specialized: candidates, legislators, and officials can now work directly with interest and ideological support groups, bypassing the party and congressional hierarchies that previously controlled and limited the political agenda.
199 But Congress itself-with its ungainly decision-making procedures and innumerable conflicts among representatives of diverse localities, interests, and values-is institutionally incapable of managing the resulting profusion of policy demands. Its solution is to delegate lawmaking to administrative agencies that possess the advantages of hierarchy and specialization that Congress lacks; agencies can deploy modern technology much more efficiently in managing the "stakeholder communities" engaged 195 For a suggestion that the answer may be "yes," see Free Enter. , Feb. 16, 2017) . The CFPB's taxfree finance was not at issue in the panel's decision and opinion. 196 See DeMuth, supra note 1, at 157-62; see also sources cited supra note 14. 197 DeMuth, supra note 1, at 158-69. 198 Id. at 160. 199 Id. at 159.
in each policy field, and can be multiplied essentially without limit. 200 In this view, Congress has evolved from lawmaker into enabler of executive government. Its institutional function is to establish semi-autonomous specialpurpose governments, while its individual members pursue their electoral careers as official lobbyists of those governments on behalf of narrow interest groups and broad ideological or partisan causes.
This construct is, at least on the surface, highly pertinent to the emergence of agency taxation and for-profit enforcement. It suggests that, at variance with the longstanding view of many scholars, legislators might not distinguish sharply between delegating lawmaking and delegating taxing and spending. 201 The established analysis is that legislators (1) vote for broadly popular causes such as clean air, safe products, and honest finance; (2) leave the real, contentious policy choices to the agencies-while "stacking the deck" in favor of certain interest groups through administrative procedures and standards of judicial review; and (3) maintain at least a modicum of control over agency choices through the "power of the purse"-budgeting, appropriations, and appropriation riders. 202 In this view, legislators have simply discovered a new means of muddling political accountability. But if legislators are instead pioneering a new form of specialized, atomized government to accommodate the demands of specialized, atomized modern politics, then they might find it advantageous to delegate financial power along with lawmaking power. After all, taxing and spending can be as contentious, and as problematic for collective congressional choice, as fashioning rules for private conduct. And agency regulation, from setting telephone and electricity prices to setting pollution and energy standards, has always involved implicit taxing of some groups for the benefit of others-so why not give the agencies explicit taxing and spending power as well?
The other author, Michael Greve, has proffered, though with no great confidence, a public choice explanation for the ascent of for-profit government. 203 As suggested earlier, for-profit government appears particularly prevalent in industry sectors that are highly concentrated and only nominally private-and, moreover or perhaps therefore, are characterized by very high rates of return: pharmaceutical and health care companies, "systemically important" banks and other financial firms, and defense contractors. 204 Returns in these industries probably include substantial rents from government regulation and private-public partnerships. 205 At the same time, relatedly or not, those same industries are viewed with considerable suspicion on the Right as well as the Left, as exemplars of "crony capitalism" or "government for Wall Street." 206 Congress could respond by adopting more efficient rules to govern the industries, or by appropriating the rents through taxation. Unable to do either, Congress resorts to the second-best means of empowering the executive to confiscate the rents and to distribute them, haphazardly and more or less, to the kinds of constituencies Congress might service if it still had the capacity. The system converges on an "adversarial corporatism": an unholy matrimony between the state and industry, made no better by a bilateral show of enmity. That view makes a lot of empirical evidence "fit"-but only at the federal and perhaps the state level. (For-profit government at a local level appears mostly a matter of exploiting local citizens with inadequate tax capacity or political resources, especially minorities.) Moreover, it threatens to collapse into the "explanation" that Congress is impotent and the executive runs the show.
Conceivably, these two conceptions could be combined into a single account that links the electoral incentives of legislators to the organizational incentives of capaciously endowed special-purpose agencies. We cannot move from speculation to hypothesis without first knowing more about the provenance, dynamics, and residual congressional oversight of agency taxation, for-profit enforcement, and expenditure of the proceeds. We can, however, suggest several paths of analysis.
To begin with legislative incentives and behavior: why would Congress delegate taxing and spending authority along with regulatory authority? The examples this Article has offered counsel caution with respect to any global answer. The FCC universal service program looks like a path dependency story: instead of yanking established but increasingly infeasible telecom cross-subsidies into the appropriations process-as it did with small-community airline service when it abolished airline regulation in the late 1970s-Congress authorized the FCC to continue them on its own by direct and explicit means. 207 The PCAOB was part of a hastily enacted statute that packaged previously rejected proposals, sight unseen, into a single "reform" initiative. 208 Neither of these innovations appears to have been subject to any 204 serious congressional debate. 209 The CFPB and its financing structure was the product of a Congress and administration under the control of a single party, determined to insulate the newly created agency against interference by a president or a future Congress under the control of the other party.
210 That decision has the makings of a public choice story: a momentary partisan majority "stacks the deck" in favor of its interest-group coalition, more thoroughly than the mere jiggering of administrative procedures could do, at the cost of weakening future Congress's power of the purse over its handiwork. But it seems not to extend to other mentioned examples, and the creation of revolving enforcement funds has been a similarly haphazard affair. It is difficult to identify any common theme across all of the cases analyzed beyond Congress's disregard for its long-term institutional interests.
As noted earlier, standard explanations of that pattern turn on asymmetric incentives between Congress as an institution and those of its individual members. Congress as an "it," the theory goes, cheerfully delegates lawmaking power because individual legislators (or committees) stand to gain by first voting for aspirational statutes and, down the road, complaining over agency abuse and overreach or, alternatively, about sloth and capture, and by performing services for favored constituencies. 211 On that theory, though, broad delegations of lawmaking or waiver authority should go hand-in-hand with increased congressional vigilance with respect to the means of backstopping agencies-foremost, budgetary means. 212 Delegations of tax authority and self-funding mechanisms that disconnect agencies from the appropriations process seem to cut in the opposite direction. They suggest that a Congress that surrenders its lawmaking authority will eventually surrender other authorities as well, including even the means of agency control. Then again, it may be that Congress delegates revenue-generating authority to agencies for its own purposes, with an expectation that the agencies will in fact heed those purposes, and with a full intent of ensuring compliance: how much have you collected for us, lately? What looks at first sight like another delegation may in fact be an affirmative command to generate revenue, with Congress rewarding agencies with greater regulatory and spending autonomy as compensation for undertaking the politically unpleasant task of revenue raising through explicit tax programs or targeted fines and settlements. Legislators and Budget Manipulation, 56 PUB. CHOICE 167, 178 (1988) (describing the budget as "the most effective sanction" for influencing agencies).
CONCLUSION
Returning to where this Article began: how would the incentives and behavior of agencies be affected by possession of independent sources of revenue, freedom from regular appropriations, and attendant discretion over the levels and objects of taxing and spending? Unlike tax collectors in the early days of the republic, 213 the officers of modern agencies are salaried employees and may not work on commission. And unlike true profit-maximizing private attorneys, public prosecutors may not reap direct, overt financial gains from their activities. What exactly, then, do they maximize in pursuing big financial penalties and crafting their own tax and spending programs?
Political scientists have developed a large, frequently sophisticated literature on this subject. That literature would surely benefit from incorporating the new factors-of-production of agency self-finance, especially if the factors were quantified with better empirics than currently exist. For example, one prominent school of thought contends that agencies seek to maximize reputational values as a means of enhancing their autonomy and keeping their critics at bay. 214 Are agencies discovering that imposing monetary penalties and allocating the proceeds are superior (or complementary) to jail terms and enhanced regulatory oversight in promoting reputation and autonomy? Perhaps settlements and disbursements are means of maintaining an equilibrium of costs and benefits among different agency stakeholders (with the costs falling as much as possible on those who are not immediate, knowledgeable stakeholders, i.e. the shareholders and customers rather than managers of regulated firms). 215 Or perhaps settlements are put options on favorable regulatory treatment going forward. Questions such as these deserve systematic study.
Beyond that, "reputation" and "autonomy" are instrumental to pursuing-what, and for whom? Billion-dollar settlements may be a bona fide regulatory tool, superior to ex ante regulation in achieving statutory goals. On the other hand, it may be that the executive state is seizing additional power from Congress rather than serving as its agent in accommodating modern politics. That is, the executive may be discovering that it is superior at taxing and spending as well as at writing rules-and is running off with the 213 See JERRY MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 34-38, 44-45 (2012 proceeds to build independent empires while Congress is institutionally incapable, or disinclined, to mount effective resistance. Whatever the explanation, legislative and executive means and ends need to be integrated. These are urgent questions. Large numbers of American citizens have come to suspect that the administrative state has jumped the constitutional levees, that it is no longer administering on their behalf, and that it has regressed into a racket for the wealthy and well-connected. Law and scholarship need to catch up. : 33,458,363 6,275,100 22,210,000 479,000 5,146,650 7,762,600 44,750,070 120,081,783 Totals from 2008 Financial Collapse: 20,180,730 6,275,100 22,210,000 58,000 4,326,650 3,259,350 41,891,770 98,201,600 
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